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Biased phi losophical theorizing about moral 
matters is doubly reproachable. After all. both 
genuine philosophy mll!. genuine morality aim at 
unprejudiced viewpoints. Surely their union should 
produce no less. This. however. has hardly been the 
case; witness moral philosophy's historical 
accommodation with, if not outright support of. 
wrongful practices like slavery, lhe subjection of 
women, and the slaughter of animals for human 
wants. In this paper I will explore the underlying 
value assumptions which have contributed to this 
hislorical record, The two value assumptions which 
have been the most pervasive and innuential in 
lraditional morallheory are rationalty and pleasure. 
Exclusive rei iance on either of these two basic 
values leads, I wll1 argue. to an inadequate moral 
theory. Rationality-based moral theories tend to 
innate unjustlftably the value of (some) humans at 
the expense of the value of other sentient beings. 
Pleasure-based moral theories, on the other hand, 
tend lo be impartial. but not complete, A complete 
and impartial moral theory, I will argue, will 
acknowledge pleasure (or sentience) as the primary 
inlrlnsic value; but will also acknowledge a formal 
and independently based value-aspect of our world 
(of which value-aspect rationality is an instance), 
Such a complete theory would grant a higher status 
to rational humans, but it would still condemn our 
present treatment of non-human animals. 
Plato. Aristotle, and Kanl offer examples of 
moral theories in which rationalfty plays a cenlral 
value-role. For Plato this value-role is mainly 
instrumental. Reason is that faculty which grasps 
Quality in thlngs--their measure, proportion. 
harmony, beauty.! Reason endows a being with value 
because reason can lead one to the highest level of 
reality--the realm of the Forms, For Aristotle. 
rational activity--with its distinctive objects. its 
attendant pleasures. the ties of affection it enables--
is itself lhe purest. most self-sufficient mosl divine 
and ennobling of activities.2 In Plato's and 
Aristotle's eyes. to lack rationality is to be an 
impoverished, more limited. and less valuable being. 
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Those who lack some degree or more of the rational 
aspect, like non-human animals, natural slaves (and 
women, for Aristotle), must subordinate their ends 
to those of the fully rational humans. 
Kant, and other fellow deontologists. also hold 
that what endows humans with value demanding of 
respect (dignity) is rationality. Rationality enables 
them to make free choices, to be autonomous centers 
of action. and thus to be not only different from. but 
superior to, lesser animals. It is this freedom which 
Kant asks us to respect when he exhorts us to act in 
such a way that one's principle of action admits of 
universalization, and thus of (hypothetical) approval 
by the recipients of one's action. If others would 
(upon rational consideration) approve of my principle 
of action. then in effect their wishes, will. freedom, 
are not being violated by my act. Since freedom, for 
Kant, derives from reason, a proper action is one 
which respects another's reason. A. Donagan 
expresses this point when he states: 
Since treating a human being. in virtue of 
its rationality, as an end in itself, is the 
same as respecting it as a rational 
creature, Kant's formula of the fundamental 
principle may be reinstated in a form more 
like the scriptural commandment that is its 
original; Act always so that you respect 
every human being, yourself Qr another, as 
being a rational crealure.3 
The major philosophical alternative to rationality 
as the central value in a moral theory is pleasure 
(broadly construed to encompass all positive sentient 
states of consciousness). Bentham and Mill are 
among those who have considered pleasure as the 
only intrinsic value. To be sure, Mll1 tries to 
differentiate between lower- and higher-quality 
pleasures, with intellectual pleasures placed at the 
top of the quality scale. Given this addition, Mill can 
claim that rationality and autonomy are of particular 
instrumental value. because among other things they 
enable one to experience the highest pleasures in life. 
However, should all feeling be removed from the 
universe. rationality and autonomy would 
presumably be stripped of all value. Freedoms, 
books, and paintings that cannot be experienced and 
enjoyed become. on this view, worthless. 'will say 
more on this later. 
If If If 
In addition to pleasure and ratjonality, are there 
other plausible contenders for the role of ultimate, 
non-reducible values? The following come to mind: 
love (of others, of creation, of the Divine); the 
highest objects of love (the Forms, the One, the 
Brahman. the Judeo-Christian God .. ,); the soul or 
Alman; existence itself, in any form. Since this 
issue is not central to my present task. my 
comments on these other candidates for intrinsic 
value will be brief--perhaps too brief. 
love has often been sung by poets, prophets. and 
philosophers as the highest object of praise. 
However. what tends to be the case in their 
celebrations of love is a focus on the higher and 
purer forms of love (cf. Paul's famous 
characterization in Corinthians I, chapters 13-14). 
No one eulogizes love of cruelly, bestiality. or even 
common heterosexual love. Perhaps it is improper 
to characterize the feelings directed at such objects 
as love. Perhaps love surfaces only in connection 
with higher objects and with things of beauty (outer 
or inner). But if one's feeling for cruelty is intense 
and persistent enough, why not call it love? Should 
love not be identified phenomenologically and 
behaviorally (and not through its correlative 
objects)? If objects characteristicllily pleasant can 
give one pain (e.g., Beethoven's Ninth Symphony 
becomes painful to hear for Alex in Clockwork 
Orange), why cannot objects normally hateful evoke 
love? I propose that they can, and that to say 
otherwise is to beg the question. If so, love itself 
cannot be intrinsically valuable since some instances 
of love are objectionable. 
However, perhaps traditional praise of love is 
directed at the feeling per se, independently of its 
objects. What is sought is perhaps an enriched 
intensity of feeling and life. If so, love may be 
advanced as intrinsically valuable. But then the 
position becomes a form of hedonism. love as 
feeling would accrue intrinsic value insofar as the 
feeling is desirable. The hedonist can easily 
acknowledge the 'higher' forms of love, namely, 
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those whfch have the further merit of promoting the 
happiness of others, 
What about the highest objects of love: Divine 
Objects or Divinities--do these have intrinsic 
worth? Again. only a few comments will be possible 
on this complex matter. First, some see 'divine' as 
Implying perfection and ultimate value. Plato and 
Aristotle are amongst these; and supporters of many 
religions also fall in this group. Others, inclUding 
some interpreters of Christianity and of other major 
religions, prefer to distinguish between benevolent 
and malevolent divinities, For these latter theorists, 
divinity itself is not a mark of value, What makes 
some Gods valuable, then, turns out to be some other 
Quality like benevolence. If 50, the valued Quality 
may admit of some utilitarian-hedonistic analysis. 
Those who find the divine realm as exclUding 
imperfection and evil. are more difficult to deal 
with. This is particularly the case when mystical 
and 'negative' theologies are involved. QJite 
possibly the mystics have had access to a realm of 
perfection and of sui generjs value. But if this realm 
and its value Is Indeed sui generjs. and 
incomprehensible for us non-mystics, then the best 
we can do Is plead Ignorance and leave this option 
open. Often. however, those who Identify the divine 
with perfection view the divine realm as including 
perfected versions of human traits: thought, 
consciousness. will. pleasure, power, If the 
ordinary value of these traits can ultimately be 
attributed to the pleasures and satisfactions they 
provide (both intrinsically and instrumentally), then. 
again, It can be maintained that what makes the 
existence of divinities (or of our souls raised to 
divine levels) inherently and consequentially 
valuable Is the pleasure-satlsfactlon they experience 
and enable the world to share In (to whatever 
degree), Something similar can be said If human 
powers derive their value from rationality. The 
Platonic Forms, for instance, as the ultimate rational 
objects. are made to order for a value-theory based 
on ratlonaltty. 
Might the hedonist say that· the Forms' value 
derives from the activity of the minds (human or 
divine) which grasp and comprehend them? In 
comprehending them, perhaps minds experience their 
highest and most perfect satisfactions. Such 
satisfactions after all do have ordinary 
counterparts. The artist who finally captures an 
elusive intelligible form (a "significant form" for 
Clive Bell) on canvas or through some other medium, 
experiences an intense satisfaction. An intellectual 
who finally sorts out, clarifies, and sets in order the 
threads of some particularly difficult and convoluted 
subject matter, also feels a distinctive satisfaction, 
Being able to carry out these expressive, ordering 
feats at higher levels must surely carry with it 
hIgher degrees of satIsfaction. Whether the 
experiential (hence instrumental) aspect is all there 
is to the value of Quality, order, beauty, form, the 
Forms, is a rich and complex Question. I will say 
more on it later. 
Christian tradition attributes intrinsic value to 
the soul, shared by all humans and making them equal 
In the eyes of God. Non-tluman animals. in contrast, 
either lack a soul or possess a lower and morlal type 
of soul. Thus in Christianity there is no Question of 
the resurrection and eternal life of non-human 
animals. The soul has been viewed as that 
immaterial substance in us In which perception. 
sensation, thought, judgment. and will are centered. 
The key problem with attempts to derive Intrinsic 
value from souls is that such attempts merely tend 
to postpone the problem of Value without solving It. 
Thus, one wf1l want to know what makes the human 
soul particularly valuable. Is It Its being a soul? Is 
it its being a !lllIIlan soul? Is its having certain 
species-neutral attributes? 
If the answer is that being a soul makes us 
valuable. we should want an explanation of this 
claim. WlW. Is It that makes souls valuable? One 
answer would appeal to the ~ of souls (and of 
human souls in particular). This would lead to 
cognition, rationality. and free will as the value-
endowing attributes. since the powers of sensation 
and perception are shared by the other, less 
valuable, animals. But at this point we are back to 
Aristotle and Kant. 
A second option would be to say that there Is 
something divine and indefinable about souls from 
which value derives. However, to say that X Is 
valuable because there is something valuable in X is 
to make no explanatory progress. I see no other 
options. so I conclude that the notion of soul does not 
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add any new intrinsic values to the ones thus far 
surmised. 
On the Neo-Platonlc and Augustinian view that all 
existence is good. i.e .• endowed with intrinsic value, 
I will make only one comment. The only way this 
view has plausibility is on some panpsychlstic view 
of matter. otherwise, I fail to see how one justifies 
attributing any degree of intrinsic value to every 
speck of matter. If one does Interpret the view 
panpsychistically. then one leaves the door open for 
some hedonistic analysis of the value attrIbuted to 
every existent. 
If If It 
I conclude, albeit tentatively. that rationality 
(broadly construed to include the power and activity 
of thought. of refiectlve autonomous cholce-maklng. 
of intellectual abstract comprehension. of artistic 
expression), and pleasure (broadly construed to 
Include the satisfying. such as one feels upon 
carrying out and completing an intellectual or 
artistic exercise) emerge as the only candidates for 
intrinsic value. Can either alone be sufficlent 8S the 
centerpiece of a complete and Impartial moral 
theory? I believe not, though for dIfferent reasons. 
Consider first ratlonallty-based theories. 
Clearly If rationality were the m value worth 
upholding. and If the power of abstract thInking 
(Involving items like numbers. and principles) were 
required ror rationally, then clearly some humans 
and all non-human animals would lack intrInsic value. 
Surely. thIs consequent Is false. Perhaps no actual 
rationaltty-based theory is thIs pure and exclusive. 
Thus, the target or this point may not be any major 
historical theory. 
Yet Aristotle, Kant. and perhaps others. have 
come perilously close to advancIng thIs extreme 
rationality-based view. Aristotle. after all. 
justified slavery on the grounds that some humans 
are less than rational. He argued on similar grounds 
for a subordinate role for women and chl1dren.4 And. 
clearly, a case can be made that on Aristotle's view 
non-human animals have no Intrinsic worth. 
Kant, too, on at least one occasion attributes a 
lower value-status to women. since he finds them 
incapable or acting from (rational) prlnciples.s And 
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about animals he says the following: 
Animals are not self-conscious and are 
there merely as a means to an end. That 
end is man ...Our duties to animals are 
merely indirect duties to mankind. ... If a 
man shoots his dog because the animal Is no 
longer capable or servIce. he does not fail in 
his duty to the dog. for the dog cannot 
judge. but his action is inhuman and damages 
in himself that humanity which it is his duty 
to show towards mankind.o 
Beings whose existence depends, not on our 
will, but on nature. have nonetheless, if 
they are non-ratlonal only a relative value 
and are consequently called thlngs.7 
A. Donagan. while not addressing the issue or animals 
directly, says the follOWing about other less-than-
rational creatures: 
The insane. who cannot wholly take care of 
themselves. must be looked after; and. if it 
Is necessary for their well-being. may be 
constrained to do various things they would 
.not do If they had their own way. The 
Question of how far a man's Insanity gives 
right of coercion Is a dimcult one.... The 
general principle. however. is clear: since 
a madman Is a rational creature whose 
reason is impaired, he is enlltled to the 
respect due to a normal rational creature 
except to the extent that the Impairment of 
his reason makes It necessary to prevent 
harming himself or others .... 8 
Clearly, the Implication is that non-human animals. 
Insofar as they are not rational creatures. are not 
deserving of respect. Note also the insistence on 
calling the insane "rational creatures" despite their 
often permanent lack of rationality. This is a case of 
a Kanllan unwilling to accept the implications of 
Kantianism. 
It is. of course. possible to take Aristotelian or 
Kantian outlooks without unduly depriving various 
creatures of intrinsic value. This can certainly be 
Sprtng 1990 
• 
• 
• • • 
Mor.1 Theories. Imp.rU.ltly.•nd the Status or Non-R.Uon.l. SenUent Belnts 
done by admitting other intrinsic values in addition to 
rationality, but subordinate to it. In such a case, 
however. the theory would not be a pure ratlonallty-
based theory. I will, in fact, argue for such a mixed 
theory later . 
• One can also moderate a rationality-based outlook 
by treating ratlonal1ty as subject to degree. Even 
so, however, those (would-be) sentient creatures 
devoid of ~ ratfonal1ty would stili end up being 
intrinsically valueless. Such an outcome would be 
unacceptable. For. whatever the rational powers of 
a being, Its feeling pleasure would be objectively 
preferable to its feeling pain (everything else being 
equal). Moreover, in addition to this philosophical 
objection. one must not forget the historical point 
that Aristotelian and Kantlan outlooks have tended to 
Inflate the value-gap between some/most humans 
and "lower" sentient beings. It Is no accident that It 
was not Kant. but MlII who broke with tradition and 
argued not only for the equal status of women, but 
also for the recognition of the intrinsic value of 
animals.9 
Consider now the opposite kind of moral theory--
one which derives ~ value from pleasant slates of 
consciousness. Let us call this theory Hedonistic 
Utilitarianism (HU).lO 
HU has been commonly attacked on the grounds 
that it is at odds with our. deeply held moral 
judgments concerning the value of Individuals 
(particularly b!JID.an individuals). From the viewpoint 
) of common morality, while HU is capable of endowing 
non-humans with Intrinsic value, It necessarily 
underestlmates the value of Individual humans. This 
underestlmatlon Is due to the fact that HU conceives 
the individual as a value-neutral receptacle--a mere 
bearer of pleasant and unpleasant experiences ,II 
These latter experiences alone are treated as 
intrinsically valuable or dtsvatuable. Consequently, 
on HU. the aim of moratlty becomes the maximization 
of pleasant experiences, impersonally considered, 
This view, opponents claim, is flawed because it 
falls to take into accouot--hence falls to protect--
the value, rights, sacredness, of the individual 
(human). For example, it is alleged that HU must in 
some cases recommend the sacrifice, in secret. of a 
healthy innocent person, If his/her organs can be 
used to save a number of other persons of similar 
age and potential. Since this is surely morally 
repulsive (ft violates the individual's ~), HU in 
recommending this course of action. proves Itself 
InadeQuate. In short, It is unequipped to capture and 
explain the immeasurable value of the Individual 
(human) as recognized by our considered moral 
judgments. 
I grant that here there Is a conflict between HU 
and our "considered" moral judgments. 12 When a 
similar conflict arose between our judgments and 
rationalty-based morality, we declared the latter as 
InadeQuate. Should we not do the same here, and 
declare HU Inadequate? Note. however, that In the 
case of our considered attribution of intrinsic value 
to non-rational animals. we did find a rational basis 
for this, namely, sentience. Can we find a similar 
rational basis for our common attribution of 
immeasurable value to individuals (humans, 
particularly)? If not. perhaps we should, rationally. 
abandon this pre-theoretical moral judgment. 
Is there something, then. about each indiVidual 
human. other than sentience, which endows It with 
immeasurable Intrinsic value? If value does not 
derive from the contents of the receptable, it must 
lie In the receptacle itself. This is, after all, what is 
implied by the anti-utllilarians when they maintain 
that HU misplaces value in locating It among the 
contents of the receptacIe. But how can the bare 
human receptacle/Individual/particular be endowed 
with special intrinsic value? If by "Individual" one 
means "bearer of properties" (or, similarly, "that 
which survives property-changes", or "that which 
Individuates each member of a set of perfect 
clones"), then rocks would be. or would Include, 
Individuals. Yet. rocks are surely not sacred. 
Perhaps "individual", as used In moral contexts, 
means "bearer of sentience" , or "bearer of human 
sentience", or even "bearer of rational sentience." 
Then, what we would want to know Is in what sense 
Is the Individuality correlated with (human. rational) 
sentience superior to the individualtty correlated 
with nonsentient properties? If it Is not sentience, 
or rationality, or humanity. which supplies value, 
what can it be? How can the sheer individuality of 
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the bearer of human properties do this?13 
At thIs point, one tempting option is to say that 
though we know. by Intuition. that the human 
Individual is endowed with a source of immeasurable 
value, we cannot explain what thIs is. 
This is obviously a blind alley. Do we intuitively 
recognize this X-value source only In some/all 
humans? Or also in other animals? In trees and 
flowers? In rocks? How do we know that this 
intuitive grasp is anything other than a specles-
preserving bias resulttng from evolutIonary 
pressures, and preserved through unclear thinking? 
I suggest that these questtons cannot be answered 
satisfactorily, 
A second option is to appeal to the soul as the 
value-generattng aspect (other than senttence). But. 
as we have seen. to appeal to this notion is merely to 
postpone facing the problem. Are souls an exclusive 
possession of humans? Of human and some/all other 
animals? Of plants also? What differentiates soul-
presence from soul-absence? Is it life? It Is 
sentience? Is it rationality? What endows a soul 
with value? Is it life. senttence. rationality. or 
something else? In short, the notion of soul is a 
promisory note which needs to be cashed out. As 
soon as it is cashed out. It turns into famIliar 
candIdates of IntrInsic value. 
A third optton is Kant's option: value accrues in 
individuals insofar as they possess reason, But this 
option has already proven itself hard to digest. 
Moreover, is rationality endowed with Intrinsic 
value? A case can be made that its entire value Is 
Instrumental. I will return to this issue later. 
For the present I conclude that though. as the 
critics observe. HU Is unable to capture and explain 
at least one central jUdgment of common considered 
morality. this Is Insufficient to prove the Inadequacy 
of HU. What this clash appears to Imply instead. is 
that deontologlcal views of rights and absolute 
prohibitions. resting as they do on the absolute value 
of the IndivIdual human, mIght have to be abandoned. 
And this paves the way for the permIssibility of 
harming innocents as a means to bring about some 
impersonally greater net good. I admit that this Is 
trOUbling and repugnant. but I cannot justtfy my 
repugnance, 
Perhaps m we find this repugnant Is because. 
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as T, Nagel argues. our viewpoint on the world is not 
confined to the impersonal. impartial. objective 
perspective. We also face the world from a 
subjective, personal. partial perspective. Thus. if I 
am a doctor who ~ secretly kill A (say A is an 
..innocent old man who would die in amatter of months 
anyway. but who refuses my pleas for voluntary 
self-sacrifice) In order to save four promising young 
•people. who would otherwise die. I might not ~ 
to bring myself to Kill A in a personal face-to-face 
manner. no matter what the benefits.''! But If I were 
simply told that depending on which button I press, 
either one or four Innocent Martians will die 
presently on Mars (pressing IlQ. button means the 
four will die), I might find It less difficult to save the 
four by killing the one, In the latter case I am able to 
adopt a more impersonal viewpoint than I could in the 
former case. 
At any rate. this possible explanation for my 
unwillingness to harm Innocents In order to produce a 
greater net good. does not rationally justify this 
unwlllfngness and repugnance .15 Thus the latter 
attitudes are not clear detectors of immorality. 
Consequently, they do not constitute a rational 
objection to HU. '6 
It It It 
It might be pointed out to us that while we are 
appalled at the idea of using some humans as means 
to some greater common good, we are not similarly 
struck by the massive use of other highly sentient 
species for mn: purposes. That is. such massive 
abuse is perpetrated on grounds even ~ acceptable 
than utilitarian grounds. At the very least a 
utilitarian outlook would reQuire taKing Into account 
all sentient creatures. Our use of animals is 
generally directed at human good only. 
Naturally, this point would be ad hominum. An 
impartial deontologist could defend the 
deontologlcally-based rights of individual humans, 
and ~ simultaneously extend rights-attribution to 
other sentient creatures. This is done, for example. 
by Tom Regan In The Case for Animal Rights, His 
attribution of rights Is based on "the sUbject-of-a-
life criterion." 
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To be a sUbject-of-a-life" ,involves more 
than merely being alive and more than 
merely being conscious. To be the subject-
of-a-Iife is to be an individual whose life is 
characterized by ... [having] beliefs and 
desires; perception, memory. and a sense 
of the future, including their own future; an 
emotional life together with feelings of 
pleasure and pain; preference and welfare-
interests; the ability to initiate action in 
pursuit of their desires and goals; a 
psychological identity over time; and an 
individual welfare in the sense that their 
experiential life fares well or III for them, 
logically independently of their utility for 
others and logically independently of their 
being the object of anyone's Interests, 
Those who satisfy the sUbject-of-a-life 
criterion themselves have a distinctive kind 
of value--inherent value--and are not to be 
viewed or treated as mere receptacles fof 
intrinsic value (which Regan attributes to 
pleasant experiences)].17 
Regan holds that to have "inherent value" is a 
sufficient condition for having rights. Moreover, 
"Inherent value" is of a kind Incommensurate with 
intrinsic value (i.e" value based on pleasant 
experiences), And since many non-human animals 
according to Regan do satisfy the above 
requirements, they will have such "inherent value.' 
Thus. many non-human anImals should also be 
recognized as having non-utilitarian rights. Witness. 
then. a species-neutral kind of deontological view. 
The soundness of this view rests, however, on 
the plausiblllty of placing a special kind of value--
"inherent value" --on. roughly, being a self (a 
"subject-of-a-life"), The claim is that this kind of 
value is Independent of the intrinsic value of some 
types of experiences. It is the kind of irreducible 
and non-instrumental value which endows one, as an 
individual or receptacle, with one's own distinctive 
worth. It is what makes some individuals sacred, 
and what precludes their use as means only. 
But is the distinction between havIng "inherent" 
value (i.e.. value as an individual and having 
"intrinsic" value (j ,e" value derived from conscious 
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exoerience5) tenable? I believe not. 
It is clear that Regan operates according to a 
substance-attribute metaphysics, He does not want 
to derive value from the attributive-pole, for this 
would lead to an impersonal ethics. Thus. he is left 
with the substance-pole as the source of intrinsic 
value. However. as we have already seen, in the 
most general sense of "substance" / "individual" 
--namely, as "bearer of properties," etc.--no 
substance/individual can be. mla. substance/individ-
ua. any more or less valuable than any other, 
Clearly. then, It must be in some other narrower 
sense of "substance" / "Individual" that Regan 
believes special value accrues to some individuals. 
This other. narrower, sense of "Individual" is what 
can be called "self" (or "subJeet-of-a-life"), But 
what differentiates selves-individuals from non-
selves-individuals? I suggest that only some 
attribute, or set of attributes. can do so. Given the 
substance-attribute assumption, there is no other 
choice, 
And. in fact. as we have seen, Regan makes use 
of a definite set of traits to explain what endows any 
X with the status of self, This set of traits includes 
consciousness, feeling, desires. belief, perception. 
self-consciousness, memory, having a sense of the 
future, having a psychological IdentIty over time. 
and having the ability to initiate goal4ilrected action, 
For Regan, being a self is. having these traits. It Is 
not some additional aspect emerging from the union 
of these traits. 
Thus, Regan's distinction between "inherent" and 
"Intrinsic" value is really an attribute-based 
distinction; it is not a distinction having individuals 
on one side and attributes on the other. "Inherent" 
value is simply a kind of "Intrinsic" value. The 
latter derives from the attribute of sentience 
(feeling. consciousness, desire. etc,); the former 
derives from a combination of attributes: sentience 
plus cognition-rationality-autonomy (beliefs, 
desires. perception. memory. having a sense of the 
future. having a psychologIcal Identity over time. 
initiating goal4iirected action), Thus, Regan does not 
really transcend the traditional rationality/sentience 
dichotomy, His contribution is the claim that 
combining sentience and rationality yields a value 
which is higher than. and which differs in kind from, 
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that of sentience alone, 
The assumption behind this last claim is, I take it, 
that a disconnected sequence of states of 
consciousness (even when such states are singly of 
intrinsic value) does not carry as much, or the same 
kind of. value as does a stream of consciousness 
which is internally unlfled, self-cognizant, goal-
directed. The latter features can be seen as the 
'form' for which sentient states are the 'matter.' 
To have both is to be a self (in Regan's or Kant's 
sense) --as opposed to being a "Humean" mind. Only 
once one is a self does one, for Regan, acquire 
spectal value as an Individual. 
The thesis that a broad form of rationality 
enhances the value of sentience (perhaps because It 
enables enriched forms of experience) has some 
plausibility. Even HU may accept It. It can thus be 
argued that a being who has both sentience and 
rationality Is of higher value than one who has only 
sentience (we will come back to this). However. 
from this it does not follow that the Increased value 
is immeasurable; or that it is incommensurate with 
"Intrinsic" value. Once one sees the attribute-type 
basis of l22.th values. such extravagant claims lose 
their initial attractiveness. 
If It did follow that "inherent" value Is uniquely 
immeasurable, it could be used to do exactly the 
opposite of what Regan wants it to do. It could be 
used to defend aKantian type of speclesism. For it Is 
highly unlikely that non-human animals possess the 
cognitive-rational powers necessary for traits like 
the genuine possession of "a sense of the future." or 
of self-consciousness, or of "a psychological 
identity over time." Each of these traits requires 
the ability to abstract from the here-now; and this in 
turn requires being equipped with conceptual-
lingUistic powers (Kant's "categories" and "Forms 
of Intuition" ) which are beyond the reach of mostlall 
non-human animals. 18 Thus, Regan's ploy--hls 
Intrinsic/inherent dlstinction--eveo If granted. 
would fail to establish value and rights parity 
between humans and other spectes of animals, If 
granted, It would not exempt the latter from belng 
legitimately used by humans as means only. 
* * * 
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What has been shown thus far? (1) We have seen 
that HU does violate some important Drlma facie 
moral judgments; (2) these judgments. however. are 
based on the attribution of a special kind of value to 
(human) Individuals; (3) attributions of this special 
kind of value have been found to be suspect; (4) 
therefore. HU' s violation of these prima facie moral 
Judgments do not prove the Inadequacy of HU. 
Before HU can be embraced. however, we must 
consider an important datum noted by Regan, Kant, 
Plato. Aristotle.... md. by J.S. Mill. The datum Is 
rationallty's capacity to enhance the value of mere 
sentience. That this Is so Is shown by the fact that If 
there were a soma-pll1 which would guarantee us a 
future consistlng of a succession of pleasant. 
conscious states--but a succession lacking form. 
unity. self-control--mostlall of us would recoil 
from taking the pill. We would prefer to be 
"subjects-of-a-life." autonomous agents. rational 
beings. even at the cost of a good deal of hardship 
and suffering, Does this datum reinstate the higher 
value of most humans? And how does HU account for 
it? 
* .. .. 
This datum can be explained in two ways. Either 
rationality Is an intrinsically valuable element, or it 
is an instrument useful In generating richer forms of 
pleasure/satisfaction. The lalter option is chosen by 
Mill. The others have chosen the former option. 
What counts for Mill are the richer. higher-
quality. pleasures "of the Intellect. of the feelings 
and Imagination. and of the moral sentiments." 19 
These pleasures render the possession of rationality 
a particularly valuable asset. Being of higher 
Quality. they outweigh much larger quantities or 
lower pleasures, Proof of this Is our refusal to take 
the hypothesized soma-pills, 
Naturally. this latter refusal does not prove that 
the higher value of the rational-sentient life derives 
from higher-Quality pleasures. Opponents would 
maintain that this value derives from rationality. 
autonomy. and from a connected sense of dignity. 
How does one decide whence the value derives? 
Consider a small-scale version of this problem, 
Consider the intellectual activity of solving a math 
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problem (or arriving at a brilliant chess move, or 
finding the right words to complete a poem or to 
summarize an argument). These activities are 
surely attended by a distinctive feeling of 
satisfaction or even elation, We would not trade 
these rational activities for activities (or passive 
states) accompanied by more "primitive" pleasures. 
Is that because of the rational nature of the former, 
or because of the distinctive pleasures attending 
them? Aristotle in his famous discussion of this in 
his Nlcomachean Ethics, Book X, opted for the 
former, In so doing he relegated the role of pleasure 
to that of "completing" the activity. But the 
obvious Question Aristotle must face is whether such 
rational activities would stili be of value If stripped 
of the pleasures attending them, One would think not. 
After all, computers can perform these activities 
without such activities thereby accruing any 
intrinsic value. 
Perhaps this is so only because computers are 
mechanical rational agents, and not autonomous 
rational agents. Hence their activities, albeit 
rational, Jack value. 
However. even after adding this element of 
autonomy to computers, so that their behavior 
becomes both rational and unpredictable and 
whatever else is needed to make it autonomous, I 
would imagine that the resulting super-eomputer and 
its activities would still not have intrinsic value, 
Yn.Im conscious sentience were to be added, Would 
this non-sentient autonomous computer be 
susceptible to harm and benefit? Again, one would 
think not, though It could be damaged. If this Is so, 
Kant's ground for respect--the autonomy/rationality 
of a being--Is undercut. HU seems to have won the 
day. 
But, somehow, there is something unappealing tn 
the view that my life is preferable to that of a happy 
pig simply because it makes possible higher-Quality 
pleasures. Is our sense of dignity and self-esteem 
not based on something else? And is the ~ 
Quality of our pleasures/satisfactions not based on 
some non-hedonistic value (like autonomy)? 
The latter has been a traditional objection to 
Ml1l's version of utilitarianism, N11I's position Is 
that what endows some pleasures with higher value 
than others Is the same factor that endows m¥. 
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pJea5ure with value--namely, the primitive 
experiential fact that we like to feel pleasure, We 
like to feel some pleasures more than others. Those 
who know both prefer Intellectual-artistic pleasures 
to the (often) more tntense pleasure of the nesh. 
Thus. the former are of higher Quality. Such higher 
Quality has, therefore, a hedonistic foundation. That 
Is the end ofthe story for Mill. 
But is preferring X to y the same as liking to feel 
X more than Y? Is there anything we like to feel 
more than food, drink, and sex? Admittedly, If 
forced to choose. those who have also experienced 
intellectual-artistic pleasures might I2r.U a life 
containing m the latter pleasures to a life 
containing m the more Intense pleasures of the 
nesh. But Is thts simply due to our liking some 
feelings mn than others? Might not our preference 
be based on other factors? 
Naturally, such other factors may be simply the 
greater safety, stability, self-sufficiency of the 
intellectual-artistic pleasures. But these are not 
ennobling faetors--they are merely prudential ones, 
That is. I suspect, why Mill himself rejected the use 
of these factors In explaining the higher Quality of 
some pleasures. 
Clearly Nl1l, too, like Plato. Aristotle, and Kant, 
wants to capture that special quality which endows 
some human activities with (the potential for) 
dignity and nobility. But It Is not clear that he 
succeeds In this through purely hedonistic terms. 
It It It 
As an alternative, I suggest that our world has 
certain objective, non-experiential features which 
somehow have Independent worth. Such features 
seem to have an irreducibly formal aspect. The 
orderliness, symmetry. organizatlon, ...in such 
disparate things as butternles, ,sunsets, numbers, 
natural cycles, musical patterns, ...Allit human 
rationality, have long been viewed by thinkers and 
poets as endowed. with a special significance O.e., 
beauty?) not derived from the experience of 
subjects. No one more than Plato appreciated this 
formal. aesthetic, Qualitative aspect of our world. 
Following the Pythagoreans, he tended to explain this 
aspect In terms of the harmony of parts. Physical 
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beauty. moral goodne5s. social justice. cosmic 
grace, for Plato, derived their attractive quality 
from the harmonious arrangement and operation of 
constituents. Reason he saw as that faculty which 
seeks, identifies. and appreciates proper form. or 
beauty. In some sense. rationality (broadly 
construed) is both a mirror to the beauty of the 
world. and an example of this formal aspect of 
order. Thus. we see reason's natural disposition 
towards well-rounded creations. As an example of 
this pervasive aspect of harmony. symmetry. form. 
reason loo shares in the peculiar value of this 
universal aspect. It is this aspect which eludes (non-
human) animal consciousness. 
But how can form. symmetry. have 1ntrlnsic 
value? Would a world of beautiful things with no 
conscious subjects to experience them be any more 
valuable than a thoroughly ugly world? I would think 
not. 
Yet. it is as if the value of a beautiful but 
sUbjectless world were there in potential, dormant 
form. as if hidden by darkness. Then the light of 
consciousness comes. and ils value is unveiled. 
discovered. but not created. 
Some might object that the symmetry of colors. 
shades. numbers, words ...--the beauty we detect--
derives Its value from our specific perceptual-
psychological make-up. A rational being with the 
perceptual apparatus of a bat would fail to detect the 
'beauty' of a piece of music. 
Yet the pattern of notes underlying the music, for 
example. could be appreciated visually and 
mathematically (e.g., by translating it into some 
clever color pattern. or graph pattern. or numerical 
pattern). Thus, we might reply that beauty has a 
dimension which transcends anyone perceptual 
mode. though not necessarily IDl perceptual modes. 
Beauty is built on a foundation of symmetry and 
regularity which can be abstracted from a specific 
medium. Such a foundation has a rational make-up, 
and that explains why rationality can detect it. 
It may well be that rationality has no intrinsic 
value--since it needs to be triggered into value-
status by sentient consciousness. But once 
triggered. it adds lo the world a value independent of 
pleasure. This appears paradoxical. But is it any 
more paradoxical than saying that a seed, in 
containing the genetic blueprint of a tree, in a sense 
is already a tree. though it needs the matter to fi" 
out the genetic form? Indeed the tree would not 
exist without the matter; but a tree is no mere chunk 
of matter. Likewise, the blueprint contained in the 
seed of rationality ~ an essential element to the • 
matter of sentience. 
This solution. if tenable. would explain why 
" thinkers from Plato to the present have viewed 
rationality as the source of the greatest (or of all) 
value. It would also explain Mill's version of a 
utilitarianism which tends to overnow its hedonistic 
boundaries. And it may. finally, explain our higher 
status when compared with non-rational sentient 
creatures. This higher value does not. however. put 
us on some infinitely higher pedestal. Hence. it does 
not justify using non-rational creatures as means to 
satisfy our wants. for they, if sentient. have 
Intrinsic worth as well (on a par with mentally 
disabled humans). Perhaps in extreme survival 
situations. where we must choose between eIther 
some of us or some non-rational sentient beings. it 
might be justified to destroy some of the latter 
(painlessly, if possible). But this is not, generally 
speaking, our sItuation today. There are plenty of 
other options available in dealing with problems of 
resources. of animal growth-containmenl, etc. 
Thus. our present treatment of millions of sentient 
creatures remains unjustifiable. 
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